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The overall aim of this article is to analyse the taxpayers’ rights to confidentiality and privacy in exchange of information including the new global
standard of automatic exchange of information. Section 2 will analyse the state of the art regarding the right to privacy and confidentiality in the
OECD bilateral and multilateral instruments, in the Human Right Conventions and in case law by the European Court of Human Rights and
the European Court of Justice. This section will also analyse the application of the right to privacy and confidentiality in practice mainly by
identifying the problems of confidentiality and privacy arising in the disclosure of information, the exchange of trade secrets and the leak of
information to the press and third parties. Subsequently, the authors explore the possibility to introduce a multilateral instrument to remedy these
shortcomings.
1 INTRODUCTION
Exchange of information (EOI) is a hot topic. From the
side of tax authorities, the increasing flows of information
between countries undoubtedly provides advantages in
terms of increased compliance and increased revenue. As
several commentators have already pointed out, the
increased availability of information also presents some
challenges with regard to the protection of the taxpayer’s
rights.1 Most doctrine in this respect focus on the right to
a fair trial and the lack of so-called ‘participation rights’
for the taxpayer involved. This paper aims to focus on the
right to privacy and confidentiality, two rights which
have according to the authors not yet gained sufficient
attention in this debate.
In Section 2, the state of the art regarding the right
to privacy and confidentiality, as applied to EOI
procedures is discussed. Attention will be given to
both theoretical considerations as well as some applica-
tions of the rights in practice. It will be concluded that
there are currently not sufficient safeguards for the
taxpayer. In Section 3, the authors explore the possibi-
lities to introduce a new multilateral instrument to
remedy these shortcomings.
2 STATE OF THE ART
2.1 Privacy vs Confidentiality
2.1.1 Definition
This article discusses both the right to privacy and the right to
confidentiality, the importance of which have been
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underestimated in tax literature until very recently.2 This gap
in literature can in our opinion at least partly be explained by
the confusion surrounding these concepts. Privacy is some-
times defined as the right to keep one’s affairs secret,3 while
the right to confidentialitymeans that information disclosed to
a person or entity should not be disclosed to an unrelated third
party whether intentionally or by accident. In tax information
exchange (TIE), the right to confidentiality means that the
taxpayer should have confidence that ‘the information
exchanged is used and disclosed only in accordance with the
agreement on the basis of which it is exchanged’.4
However, even a very straightforward example of
exchange of tax information reveals that the relationships
of privacy and confidentiality are more complex when a
concrete situation is being evaluated. For example: state A
wants to obtain information regarding alleged unreported
bank accounts held by one of its residents with a financial
institution in state B. The competent authorities of state A
send a request for information to the competent authorities
of state B on the basis of a double taxation convention
(Article 26 OECDMC). It is clear that this process prima
facie interferes with the taxpayer’s right to privacy. In addi-
tion, several relationships can be identified. First, if state B
sends a request to a financial institution in state B to obtain
information regarding that that taxpayer, the financial insti-
tution has to breach its relationship of confidentiality vis-à-
vis the taxpayer (which usually takes the form of banking
privilege). The taxpayer has trusted the financial institution
with its personal dealings and assumes that its information is
not shared with unrelated third parties. Second, after infor-
mation has been obtained by the state B competent autho-
rities, the financial institution trusts those authorities not to
disclose that information to unauthorized persons or make it
publicly available. Third, after the information has been
transmitted from the state B tax authorities, to the state A
tax authorities, the state A authorities are under an obliga-
tion both vis-à-vis the state B authorities and the taxpayer
himself to keep the information confidential on the basis of
the provisions of the double tax convention (DTC).
The precise content of these rights is also unclear. For
example, the right to privacy has physical and spatial
aspects.5 At the same time, others have submitted that a
more modern notion of the right to privacy should also
entail control over one’s personal data streams,6 which
adds a connotation making the right to privacy more
suited for evaluating the transfer and exchange of tax-
related information. Elsewhere it was also submitted
that the definition of privacy is context-dependent, mean-
ing that the application of this right can lead to different
results depending on the factual constellation to which it
is applied.7 This makes it clear that privacy, data protec-
tion and confidentiality should not be viewed as separate,
but are actually intertwined. At the same time, both
privacy and confidentiality are sometimes mentioned as
forming part of a wider right to data protection.
2.1.2 Increasing Information Exchange
also Increases Relevance of Privacy
and Confidentiality
2.1.2.1 General
The possibilities and instruments for countries to collect
and exchange information have been rapidly increasing. In
the past, tax assessments predominantly relied upon infor-
mation which was provided to the tax authorities by the
taxpayer himself through his or her tax declaration. The
global quest for more transparency has not only lead to an
increasing EOI, but the types of information which are
being shared (e.g. financial information, rulings and
APA’s,) has also increased. Furthermore, more information
is also becoming ‘fiscally relevant’ due to the increasing
use of taxation to realize other than mere budget-related
goals. Additional information has to be reported in case
taxpayers wish to call upon specific tax exemptions. For
example, certain tax exemptions aim to achieve a better
protection of the environment. This has led to the intro-
duction in several countries of tax incentives for environ-
mental friendly cars. In practice, this usually means that
the taxpayer demonstrates that his or her car complies
with the requirements as set out by the law. This boils
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6 See for an application: C.C. Aggarwal & P.S. Yu, An Introduction to Privacy-Preserving Data Mining, in Privacy-Preserving Data Mining 7 (C.C. Aggarwal & P.S. Yup eds,
Springer 2008).
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down to the taxpayer providing information (possibly
through an attestation) such as the brand of his car, the
year of manufacture, and the year of purchase. Information
which was in the past considered to be irrelevant for tax
purposes is becoming increasingly relevant to achieve
regulatory goals of the tax system.
In the examples mentioned in section 2.1.1. above,
the tax administration is still relying on information
which is provided to it by the taxpayer himself.
However, in several countries, mechanisms are in place
that allow the sharing of information from other gov-
ernment agencies and administrations with the tax
authorities. This sharing of information does not only
take place between tax administrations (e.g. information
collected for sales tax or VAT purposes is transmitted
to the direct tax authorities), but other non-tax entities
are usually under an obligation by virtue of domestic
law to provide information to the tax authorities. In
this case, the non-tax entity will need to provide the
necessary information to the tax authorities. For exam-
ple, in order to correctly assess a taxpayer’s immovable
goods for the application of a wealth tax, the tax
authorities can request information from a land registry
agency.8
In addition, the tax administration is in most countries
dependent upon reporting obligations by third parties in
order to make the tax assessment system more efficient
and reliable. For example, employers and financial institu-
tions are usually under an obligation to report income
obtained by the taxpayer directly to the tax authorities.
This system can of course be of aid to the taxpayer due to
less cumbersome reporting obligations on his side (e.g.
such information can be used to prepopulate tax returns),
but at the same time, using this method inherently carries
the risk that incorrect information is being reported by
these third parties, which could adversely affect the
taxpayer.
After the information, has been collected by the tax
administration, it can also be used for non-tax purposes.
For example, in some states the tax administration is
under a legal obligation to report possible violations of
law to other authorities (e.g. the public prosecutor or
economic or social inspections which overview the com-
pliance with economic or labour law regulations).
Recent issues include the use of ‘big data’ which is
used for tackling tax fraud. This technique could result
in ‘data profiling’. As rightly stated by Cockfield, “the
use of huge amounts of data can have an actual and
potential impact on the right to confidentiality and
privacy of the taxpayer in case that the taxpayer’s perso-
nal and business information may be used to construct a
detailed profile of an individual’s identity, including her
religious beliefs, political alliances, and personal
behavior’.9 The data which is necessary for such profiling
can be collected by cross-referencing tax databases ‘with
other information such as vehicle registrations, credit
card information, or information held by financial inter-
mediaries, to find individuals whose spending/invest-
ment patterns and tax contributions do not match
up’.10 Therefore, and in line with the current European
development on data protection, we argue that in order
to protect the use of big data, the requirements of
transparency and accountability, as stated by the
European Data Protection Supervisor should also be
applicable to tax administration like other government
agencies when dealing with personal and business data of
the taxpayer.11
It is clear that these recent developments bring up
several questions for the taxpayer: who has access to my
personal information? To which entities or states is this
information being transmitted? How long is my informa-
tion retained there? How can I correct mistakes? There is
indeed a need for a coherent framework of protection in
view of the goal of achieving more legal certainty for the
taxpayer, especially given the international developments
in this respect (see below).
2.1.2.2 International Developments
Control over personal data streams is even more important
on the international level, where information is being
transmitted across states, thus allowing more persons to
handle the information and therefore potentially increas-
ing the risk of security breaches. Information which has
Notes
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been mistakenly submitted by the taxpayer to a national
agency risks being shared not only with its own tax
authorities, but also with other states. The combination
of several concurring initiatives from the OECD, EU and
US lead to an exponential number of instruments to
exchange information. Countries and governments have
agreed that EOI is necessary to prevent tax evasion and to
tackle tax avoidance including aggressive tax planning.12
Therefore, in addition to bilateral instruments such as
DTCs and Tax Information Exchange Agreements
(TIEAs); several multilateral instruments to exchange
information have been introduced by the OECD, EU
and US. Below we provide a non-exhaustive overview.
Generally, the abovementioned information which has
been gathered by the tax authorities can also be shared
with other states, either upon request (as soon as it is ‘fore-
seeably relevant’ under the applicable instruments) or even
automatically. One example is for instance the 2010 Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) that requires finan-
cial institutions around the world to provide information on
the banking accounts of US citizens. This information is sent
by the financial institution to the national tax administration
which will be directly forwarded to the Internal Revenue
Services ‘IRS’ (US Tax Administration). This requirement
has been implemented by means of the Intergovernmental
Agreements (IGAs).13
At OECD level, several legal instruments have been pub-
lished, such as the 1988 OECD-Council of Europe
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters and its 2010 Protocol (MAC)14,
the 2014 Common Reporting Standard (CRS), and the
Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement for
Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information
(CRS MCAA).15 The automatic exchange of Financial
Account Information introduced by the CRS and its
MCAA followed the introduction of FATCA by the United
States. Concerns have risen regarding the compatibility of the
CRS with the right to privacy.16 Recently, it was called ‘the
greatest onslaught against family trust in nearly 500 years:
not since Henry VIII and the Statute of Uses in 1536 have
trusts and their beneficiaries faced so ferocious an attack’.17
The OECD, following the political G20’s mandate,18
also launched the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) Report and its Action Plan19 with fifteen
Actions to tackle tax avoidance, harmful tax practices
and aggressive tax planning. Among these actions,
Action 5 deals with Harmful Tax Regime and intro-
duces compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings
related to preferential regimes. Action 13 deals with
transfer pricing documentation that provides for
exchange of documentation such as master file, local
file and country-by-country reports among countries.
In order to obtain the information not only from the
local affiliate under examination but also from the
multinational group of companies, countries may use
any of the EOI mechanisms including automatic
exchange of information (AEOI).20 Actions 5 and 13
are two of the four minimum standards that countries
participating in the BEPS Inclusive Framework will
need to implement in their domestic tax system. 21
Therefore, these countries will be required to exchange
transfer pricing documentation including country by
country reporting.
This development has resulted in countries introducing
domestic legislation to implement Action 13. The OECD
has introduced an implementation package22 including
Notes
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20 OECD, Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, para. 15, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris, OECD Publishing
2014).
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22 In order to facilitate the implementation of the country by country reporting standard, the OECD has provided an implementation package. According to the OECD, this
package ‘consists of (i) model legislation which could be used by countries to require the ultimate parent entity of an MNE group to file the CbC Report in its jurisdiction of
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the 2016 MCAA on the Exchange of Country by Country
Reports (CbC MCAA) to facilitate the exchange of coun-
try by country reporting.23 However, despite these new
instruments introducing even more options (and obliga-
tions) to exchange tax information, the safeguards for
confidentiality and privacy have not been amended
accordingly (see section 2.1.3. below).24
At EU level, in the field of Direct Taxation, the
Council Directive 2011/16/EU as regards administrative
cooperation in the field of taxation has been amended by
extending the cooperation between tax authorities to auto-
matic exchange of financial account information (Council
Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014) and auto-
matic exchange of cross-border tax rulings and advance
pricing arrangements (Council Directive 2015/2376/EU
of 8 December 2015). In 2016, the Council Directive on
administrative cooperation has been also amended to
introduce the mandatory automatic exchange of non-pub-
lic country-by-country reporting (Council Directive 2016/
881 of 25 May 2016) and to extend the access by tax
authorities to anti-money-laundering information
(Council Directive 2016/2258 of 6 December 2016).
In addition, recent proposals have been presented by the
European Commission to amend the Accounting Directive
and the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive.25 The pro-
posed changes to the Accounting Directive includes the
requirement of (public) country-by-country reporting for
multinationals (EU and non-EU) with turnover of more
than EUR 750m and operating in Europe.26 The changes
to the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive include
the full public access to beneficial ownership registers. This
measure will affect companies and business related trusts.27
2.1.2.3 Drawbacks of the New Global Standard
It has been argued by both authors elsewhere28 that
attention for the taxpayer’s rights are more needed now
due to the adoption of the new global standard of AEOI.
There has been a shift from exchange upon request to
AEOI. In AEOI, not only specific items of information
relating to a single taxpayer (or a specific group of
taxpayers), but a bulk of information will be exchanged.
Therefore, countries should take into account that due to
the fast pace in which AEOI is going to take place, the
result may be less control over the accuracy and use of
the information by the receiving and supplying
authorities.29
Another situation that also raises concerns regarding
the protection of the taxpayers’ rights is the sharing of
information. Unlike in the past, when only tax authorities
could receive information, subject to a strict duty of
confidentiality and sanctions in case of breach of the
duty,30 nowadays, information can also be shared with
other non-tax entities. These entities are for instance
commissions or agencies aiming to investigate alleged
corruption or which intend to tackle money laundering.
Since the name and status of these agencies can be differ-
ent in accordance to each country, it is not clear whether
these entities will also have the strict duty of confidenti-
ality and what could happen if such duty would be
breached.31 The OECD Model and the MAC have made
it possible for the tax administration of the supplying
state to exchange information for tax purposes and non-
tax purposes (e.g. corruption, money laundering) with the
Receiving State.32
Notes
CbC Reports’. These models are based on the: (1) Multilateral Convention on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, or (2) Bilateral tax conventions, or (3) Tax
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs).
23 At the time of writing (Mar. 2017), more than 50 countries have signed the CbC MCAA.
24 For instance, the MCAA based on the Multilateral Convention on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAC) in s. 5 dealing with Confidentiality, data safeguards and
appropriate use states that ‘All information exchanged is subject to the confidentiality rules and other safeguards provided for in the Convention, including the provisions
limiting the use of the information exchanged’.
25 Respectively Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and
related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/
EEC and 83/349/EEC Text with EEA relevance and Directive (EU) 2015/849 on preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing (4th
Anti-Money Laundering Directive) – seeks to protect credit and financial institutions against these risks.
26 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of income tax information by certain
undertakings and branches. COM/2016/0198 final – 2016/0107 (COD).
27 Other trusts will be included in the national registers and will be available to parties who can show a legitimate interest. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and
amending Directive 2009/101/EC. COM/2016/0450 final – 2016/0208 (COD). At the time of writing (Mar. 2017), these proposals to amend the above-mentioned
Directives have not yet been adopted.
28 Mosquera Valderrama, Legitimacy and the Making of International Tax Law., supra n. 1, at 370; Diepvens & Debelva, The Evolution of the Exchange of Information in Direct Tax
Matters., supra n. 1, at 215.
29 Mosquera Valderrama, Ibid., at 370.
30 These sanctions can be for instance dismissal, fine, prison.
31 Examples are in Nigeria the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission and the Special Control Unit Against Money Laundering and in Colombia the Financial Intelligence
Unit (a special administrative unit).
32 This provision has not been included in the text of Art. 26(2) of the UN Model. However, the UN Commentary to Art. 26 states the text that can be added by contracting
states if they wish to broaden the purposes for which the information may be exchanged. The 2016 UN Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties states that ‘if
the two countries wish to allow the information to be used for a broader range of purposes (e.g. in money-laundering cases), they should specifically provide for this’. See also
paras 13–13.3 of the Commentary on Art. 26 of the 2011 UN Model. The wording in the UN is identical to the wording of the OECD Model commentary. The wording
included in the OECD Model is ‘information received by a Contracting State may be used for other purposes when such information may be used for such purposes under the
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Several tax scholars have argued that taxpayer protec-
tion should be increased in this area. For instance, in
2014, the General Reporter for the European Association
of Tax Law Professors stated that there is ‘a tension between
the legitimate rights of States to protect their tax base by collect-
ing information of taxpayers as much as possible to guarantee
taxation and the legitimate rights of taxpayers on privacy and to
be protected against the almighty power of these States’.33
Similarly, Pistone has also appealed for an increased tax-
payer protection stating that ‘(s)tronger powers for tax autho-
rities to cooperate in cross-border scenarios worldwide should
march hand-in-hand with a stronger protection of taxpayers’
basic rights’.34
In our view, the protection of taxpayers’ rights in the
relationship between the taxpayer and the tax adminis-
tration taking part in the EOI process needs to be
addressed. Therefore, the questions that should be
asked are: how will the OECD and countries protect
the right to confidentiality and the right to privacy?
What measures should be included to balance the
power between the tax administration and the taxpayer?
The protection of the taxpayer’s right to confidentiality
and privacy may help to ensure a better relationship
between the taxpayer and the tax administration which
should be based on trust, voluntary compliance and
protection of taxpayer’ rights.35 Furthermore, the pro-
tection of taxpayers’ rights will enhance the legitimacy
of the multilateral instruments to exchange information
vis-à-vis the taxpayer.36
To summarize, in this area there have been recent
developments which have led to an increasing collec-
tion and dissemination of information. A wider group
of persons have access to tax-related information, and,
as will be shown in the following sections, the protec-
tion which is offered to taxpayers is inadequate and
has even diminished at the same time. We argue that
current international (human rights) instruments
impose an obligation upon states to improve the tax-
payer’s position from a privacy and confidentiality
perspective. This will be elaborated upon in the fol-
lowing section.
2.1.3 Sources
Both of the analysed rights (privacy and confidential-
ity) can be found in provisions or instruments which
provide a legal base for the EOI, either domestic or
international instruments, or in autonomous instru-
ments which are also applicable outside the area of
EOI (e.g. human rights conventions).37
2.1.3.1 EOI Instruments
The existing instruments which provide for procedures to
exchange tax information on the international level con-
tain inconsistent references to the right to privacy and
confidentiality.
– The OECD and UN Treaty Models refer to the right to
confidentiality.38 The commentaries to these models
further refer to data protection and the right to privacy:
if contracting states are required, according to their law,
to observe data protection laws, these states can include
provisions in their bilateral conventions concerning the
protection of personal data exchange. The
Commentaries also state that data protection concerns
the rights and fundamental freedoms of an individual,
and in particular, the right to privacy, with regard to
automatic process of personal data.39 Conversely, the
TIEA Model (and its 2015 Protocol) and
Commentaries do not mention privacy or data protec-
tion, but only refer to the right to confidentiality.40
– The preamble to the MAC states that countries should
carry out measures or supply information having
regard to the necessity of protecting the confidenti-
ality of information, and taking into account of inter-
national instruments for the protection of privacy and
flows of personal data.41 Article 22(1) of the
Notes
laws of both States and the competent authority of the supplying State authorizes such use’. This wording is not found in the 2002 TIEA Model or its 2015 Protocol, which
extends the scope of TIEAs to include automatic and spontaneous exchange of information.
33 G. Marino, General Reporter. New Exchange of Information versus Tax Solutions of Equivalent Effect, EATLP Annual Congress, Istanbul, 29–31 May 2014, 46 (Amsterdam, IBFD
Publications 2015).
34 P. Pistone, Coordinating the Action of Regional and Global Players during the Shift from Bilateralism to Multilateralism in International Tax Law, 6(1) World Tax J. 4 (2014),
Journals IBFD.
35 A tax system which is perceived as fair might also increase trust in the system as such and might consequently increase voluntary compliance. See E. Kirchler, E. Hoelzl & I.
Wahl, Enforced Versus Voluntary Tax Compliance: The ‘Slippery Slope’ Framework, 29 J. Econ. Psychol. 213 (2008). See also M.T. Soler Roch, Tax Administration versus Taxpayer –
A New Deal?, 4 World Tax J. (2012), Journals IBFD.
36 See s. 3.1.2. below. See also Mosquera Valderrama, Legitimacy and the Making of International Tax Law., supra n. 1.
37 Note that evidently specific EOI instruments will need to comply with (semi-) constitutional standards such as the rights contained within human rights instruments.
However, the authors have chosen to discuss both types in order to give a more complete overview of applicable norms within this legal field.
38 OECD Model Art. 26(2) and UN Model Art. 26(2) refer to information to be treated as secret.
39 Para. 10 Commentary to para. 26(1) to OECD Model and para. 5.2. Commentary to Art. 26 UN Model.
40 Art. 8 2002 TIEA Model refer to information to be treated as confidential.
41 Preamble 2011 Convention and para. 1 Explanatory report to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters as Amended by the Protocol. OECD/
Council of Europe, France (2011), The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters: Amended by the 2010 Protocol, OECD Publishing.
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MAC deals with secrecy referring to confidentiality
and protection of personal data.42 The Commentary to
Article 22 of the MAC refers to the right to confi-
dentiality and to the right to privacy including the
various instruments addressing privacy with specific
reference to the automatic processing of personal data
(i.e. information relating to an identified or identifi-
able individual).43 The Commentary also states that
when revising the Convention in 2010, it was decided
to make it clear that the party receiving the informa-
tion shall treat them in compliance not only with its
own domestic law, but also with safeguards that may
be required to ensure data protection under the
domestic law of the supplying party. Such safeguards,
as specified by the supplying party, may for example
relate to individual access, independent oversight or
redress.
– The CRS and the MCAA refer to the rules for
confidentiality and other safeguards as provided
for in the MAC. The MCAA contains an Annex D
(Confidentiality Questionnaire) which can be also
included by the parties when concluding the
MCAA.
– At the level of the European Union, the 2011
Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC1)44
states in Article 16(1) the following: ‘information
communicated between Member States in any form pur-
suant to this Directive shall be covered by the obligation
of official secrecy and enjoy the protection extended to
similar information under that national law of the
Member State which received it’. Thus, the protection
of confidentiality is left to the domestic law of the
recipient country. Furthermore, Article 25 of DAC1
stipulates that all information has to be exchanged
in compliance with the Data Protection Directive
(see below): ‘[h]owever, Member States shall, for the
purpose of the correct application of this Directive, restrict
the scope of the obligations and rights provided for in
Article 10, Article 11(1), Articles 12 and 21 of [the
data protection directive] to the extent required in order to
safeguard the interests referred to in Article 13(1)(e) of
that Directive’.
The abovementioned examples show that even though in
most of the instruments to exchange information the
reference to confidentiality and privacy are made, these
instruments do not provide any specific safeguards to
protect the right to confidentiality and the right to priv-
acy. These instruments have left the protection of tax-
payers’ rights to international conventions (e.g. Council of
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1981
and its Additional Protocol of 8 November 2001.),45 the
EU Data Protection Directive and to domestic
legislation.46 However, there is not one multilateral
instrument that provides for specific safeguards that coun-
tries need to provide when exchanging information in
order to protect the right to confidentiality and the
right to privacy.
The Council of Europe Convention mentioned above is
the only binding instrument that potentially can have
worldwide application since the 2001 Protocol opened
this Convention to countries non-members of the
Council of Europe. However, the scope of application is
limited since up till the time of writing (March 2017),
only three countries outside the Council of Europe i.e.
Uruguay (in 2013); Mauritius and Senegal (in 2016) have
ratified this Convention.47 Thus, even in this case, one can
safely conclude that countries have not made use of this
instrument to provide a multilateral framework that pro-
tects the automatic processing of personal data.48 Up to
the authors’ best knowledge, no other (binding)
Conventions exist to protect the right to confidentiality
and the right to privacy.
Some non-binding instruments are for instance the
2006 OECD Manual on Information Exchange dealing
with the general and legal aspects of EOI including
confidentiality and tax secrecy (section 13).49 Other
non-binding OECD instruments are the 1980 (updated
in 2013) OECD Guidelines on the protection of Privacy
Notes
42 Art. 22 states that ‘any information obtained by a Party under this Convention shall be treated as secret and protected in the same manner as information obtained under the
domestic law of that Party and, to the extent needed to ensure the necessary level of protection of personal data, in accordance with the safeguards which may be specified by
the supplying Party as required under its domestic law’.
43 Para. 216 Commentary to Art. 22(1). The instruments are for example the OECD Privacy Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
(1980 and updated in 2013); the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 Jan. 1981 and
its additional Protocol of 8 Nov. 2001.
44 Art. 16 remains the same in the DAC2 that contain the recent amendments to the 2011 Directive. The 2011 Directive was amended by extending the cooperation between
tax authorities to automatic exchange of financial account information (Council Directive 2014/107/EU) and cross-border tax rulings and advance pricing arrangements
(Council Directive of 8 Dec. 2015).
45 The OECD Model and the MAC refer to this Council of Europe Convention, but the UN Model does not (cfr. para. 5.2. Commentary to Art. 26 UN Model).
46 See s. 3.3.1 for proposed safeguards.
47 Up till the time of writing (Mar. 2017), only six countries have expressed their intention to ratify the Convention (i.e. Cabo Verde, Senegal, Morocco, Mauritius, Tunisia and
Uruguay). In force in Uruguay, Mauritius and Senegal.
48 See for an analysis of this Convention Lee Bygrave, International Agreements to Protect Personal Data, in Global Privacy Protection. The First Generation 26-28 (James B. Rule &
Graham Greenleaf eds, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2008).
49 Manual on the Implementation of Exchange of Information Provisions for Tax Purposes. Approved by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 Jan. 2006.
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and Transborder Flows of Personal Data50 and the 2013
OECD Guide on the Protection of Confidentiality of
Information Exchanged for Tax purposes. 51 The 1980
Guidelines (with the 2013 update) contain the follow-
ing principles: (1) collection limitation, (2) data quality
principle, (3) purpose specification principle, (4) use
limitation principle, (5) security safeguards principle,
(6) openness principle, (7) individual participation prin-
ciple, and (8) accountability principle.52 The 2013
OECD Guide on the Protection of Confidentiality pro-
vides best practices adopted by tax administrations to
protect the tax confidentiality of the information
exchanged. This 2013 OECD Guide also provides
recommendations to help tax authorities to ensure that
confidential taxpayer information is being adequately
safeguarded.
Outside the OECD, other instruments include the
UN 1990 Guidelines on Privacy and Data Protection53
These guidelines introduce some principles concerning
the minimum guarantees that should be provided in
national legislation. These principles are (1) lawfulness
and fairness, (2) accuracy, (3) purpose-specification, (4)
interested-person access, (5) non-discrimination, and
(6) security.54 Some of these principles (security and
purpose specification) are similar to those available in
the OECD instruments (see above). A principle that is
not available in OECD instruments, is the principle of
accuracy that provides for ‘the duty of data controllers to
carry out regular checks of the quality of personal data’.
This principle of accuracy can be useful in AEOI so
that tax authorities are required to regularly check the
accuracy of the data available for exchange. Another
instrument that can provide inspiration to the regula-
tion of privacy is the 2005 Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework.55 This frame-
work also provides for information privacy principles
being (1) preventing harm, (2) providing notice, (3)
collection limitations, (4) use of personal information,
(5) mechanisms to exercise choice, (6) integrity of
personal information, (7) security safeguards, (8) access
and correction, (9) accountability. The framework is
inspired on at that time OECD 1980 Guidelines on
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data (paragraph 5 preamble).56
Even though some of the instruments to exchange
information mentioned above contain a provision ensur-
ing the confidentiality of the information exchanged,
the treatment of the information as confidential
depends on the laws of the state requesting the infor-
mation. For example, Article 26(2) OECD Model con-
tains a specific reference to confidentiality. On the basis
of this provision, the state which requests information
is bound by a duty of confidentiality in respect of
information which it obtains from the requested state.
It has been submitted that this provision has direct
effect, and the taxpayer who initially provided the
information can thus enforce this obligation before the
competent courts.57 The strength of this provision has
however faded over time. In the 1963 OECD Model
Convention, Article 26(1), in fine, contained an absolute
duty of confidentiality: ‘(a)ny information so exchanged
shall be treated as secret and shall not be disclosed to any
persons or authorities other than those concerned with the
assessment or collection of the taxes which are the subject of
the Convention’. Currently, Article 26(1) only contains a
relative duty of secrecy. This means that information
should only be treated as secret in the same manner
as information obtained under the domestic laws of the
requesting state. This arguably does not constitute a
sufficient safeguard anymore, as it depends on the laws
of the state requesting the information.
Similarly, the MAC states that the protection of private
data should be made in accordance to the domestic safe-
guards, which may be specified by the Supplying state.58
However, in the absence of safeguards by the Supplying
state, the information may be exchanged without any
restrictions with the state requesting the information.
In respect of the right to privacy, the provisions are even
more scarce. The Commentary to Article 26 of the OECD
and the UN Model refer to the rights and fundamental
freedoms of the individual, including the right to privacy.59
However, the right to privacy is not specifically defined and
it is embedded in the right to protection of personal data.
There is no clarity on how this right to privacy is protected.
Notes
50 OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (23 September 1980) updated in 2013 (OECD
Publishing 2013).
51 OECD, supra n. 4.
52 Supra n. 50.
53 Guidelines concerning Computerized Personal Data Files. Resolution 45/95 of 14 Dec. 1990.
54 Ibid.
55 The content of the APEC Privacy Framework is available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_
privacyframewk.ashx (accessed March 2017).
56 See for an analysis of this Framework, Bygrave, supra n. 48, at 43–45.
57 Diepvens & Debelva, The Evolution of the Exchange of Information in Direct Tax Matters, supra n. 1, at 216.
58 Art. 22(1) MAC Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters as Amended by the Protocol. OECD/Council of Europe, France (2011).
59 Para. 5.2 Commentary to Art. 26 UN Model.
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It is unsure what happens if the country does not have data
protection laws or the data protection laws are obsolete60
Therefore, it is submitted that in the absence of an
overarching international instrument, the problem of the
protection of personal data and the right to privacy
becomes more evident and urgent. The change from the
standard of exchange on request to AEOI will require a
binding instrument that can be ratified by countries
agreeing to exchange information (i.e. countries that
have signed the MAC and countries that have ratified
the CRS and the MCAA). Since more than 100 jurisdic-
tions have committed to EOI, the time is right to ask how
to protect the confidentiality and privacy of the informa-
tion exchanged.
At the level of the European Union, the new Directive
on Administrative Cooperation (DAC2) strengthened the
position of the taxpayer, by declaring that Reporting
Financial Institutions and the competent authorities of
each Member State shall be considered to be data con-
trollers for the purposes of Directive 95/46/EC.61 This
means that that the personal data needs to be:
– processed fairly and lawfully;
– collected for specified, explicit and legitimate pur-
poses and not further processed in a way incompatible
with those purposes;
– adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purposes for which they are collected and/or further
processed;
– accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data
which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to
the purposes for which they were collected or for
which they are further processed, are erased or
rectified;
– kept in a form which permits identification of data
subjects for no longer than is necessary for the pur-
poses for which the data were collected or for which
they are further processed.
Furthermore, information processed in accordance with
the Directive shall be retained for no longer than necessary
to achieve the purposes of the Directive, and in any case in
accordance with each data controller’s domestic rules on
statute of limitations.62 Lastly, Member States shall
ensure that each individual Reportable Person is notified
of a breach of security with regard to his data when that
breach is likely to adversely affect the protection of his
personal data or privacy.63 These changes were probably
inspired by comments of the Article 29 Working Party,
who previously expressed its concerns relating to AEOI
and data protection.64 The Working Party referred i. a. to
the Digital Rights Ireland case (see infra). The authors
concur with Somare and Wöhrer who submit that it will
be hard to reconcile the position taken in the Directive
with strict approach taken by the Court in the aforemen-
tioned case.65
2.1.3.2 Recent EOI Initiatives and Pilot Projects
At the time of writing, the OECD Global Forum on EOI
has appointed a panel of experts from member jurisdic-
tions to conduct a confidentiality and data safeguard pre-
assessments on all jurisdictions committed to AEOI.
According to the OECD, this review aims to ascertain
the readiness of jurisdictions to receive data.66 This review
should have been finalized by the end of 2016; however,
at the time of writing (March 2017) it review is not yet
available. Since countries have committed to the standard
of AEOI by 2017 (early adopters) or 2018 (late adopters),
it is urgent to have this review as soon as possible to give
opportunity to countries to implement measures to pro-
tect the confidentiality and the protection of personal data
that will be exchanged.
In order to make developing countries ready to imple-
ment AEOI, the OECD has also introduced two initia-
tives. One is the African initiative. The aim of this
initiative is to engage with African countries which are
members of the Global Transparency Forum on tax trans-
parency and EOI. The objectives were to enhance partici-
pation of African countries, to ensure that African tax
administrations have the ability and the tools needed to
request, process and use information and to build EOI
Notes
60 Two examples are for instance Brazil that has not been able to enact a data protection law, and countries in Latin America and Africa that have enacted the data protection
law but based on the 1995 Data Protection Directive. Since this Directive has now been repealed and new rules (Directive and Regulation) have been introduced to update
the data protection laws to new developments, the question is how these countries will update their data protection laws, and if so, whether these countries will use the new
rules in the EU. See s. 2.1.3.3. See also Mosquera et al., supra n. 5.
61 Furthermore, DAC2 states that each Member State shall ensure that each Reporting Financial Institution under its jurisdiction informs each individual Reportable Person
concerned that the information relating to him will be collected and transferred and shall ensure that the Reporting Financial Institution provides to that individual all
information that he is entitled to under its domestic legislation implementing Directive 95/46/EC in sufficient time for the individual to exercise his data protection rights.
62 Art. 1(5) Directive 2014/107/EU.
63 Art. 1(4) Directive 2014/107/EU.
64 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2014/20140918_letter_on_oecd_common_reporting_standard.pdf.
pdf (accessed March 2017).
65 See: Somare & Wöhrer, supra n. 2, at 813. Similar concerns were expressed by the AEFI Group, which identified several shortcomings in the DAC2 Directive and submitted
it might potentially infringe the principle of proportionality. See: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/docs/body/first_report_expert_group_automatic_
exchange_financial_information.pdf (accessed March 2017).
66 See information available at the OECD AEOI portal. http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/commitment-and-monitoring-process/ (accessed March 2017).
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capacity within African regional organizations such as the
African Tax Administration Forum. However, this initia-
tive will come to an end by the end of 2017.67
Another recent development are the pilot projects
which partner developed and developing countries to
help developing countries to implement automatic
exchange of financial account information developed by
the CRS. According to the 2015 Pilot Project Outline:
for a jurisdiction to effectively engage in AEOI on financial
information, it must have in place, as a minimum, four
essential components: (i) a legal basis for exchange; (ii) rules
that require financial institutions to report information and
follow due diligence procedures consistent with the Standard;
(iii) administrative and IT infrastructure to collect and
exchange information under the Standard and (iv) confiden-
tiality and data safeguards. Each component is critical; there-
fore all four must be in place. The extent and scale of
assistance needed under each heading will vary from country
to country depending on the extent to which these components
(e.g. legislation, IT capacity, specialised staff) are already in
place and the size and composition of the financial sector.
However, the number of countries participating in this
project are limited, and up till the time of writing (March
2017) only six pilot projects have been carried out.68 The
authors applaud these recent initiatives, but it is currently
too soon to assess their impact in practice.
2.1.3.3 Autonomous Instruments
2.1.3.3.1 Taxpayers’ Rights
In the last decade, the rights and obligations of the
taxpayer have received more attention by international
organizations. For instance, the OECD has introduced
instruments such as the 2003 Practice Note on
Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations69 and the 2015
Report on Tax Administrations in OECD countries and
other advanced and Emerging Economies.70 The 2015
Report on Tax Administrations has identified the follow-
ing taxpayer’s rights and obligations71: (1) the right to be
informed, assisted and heard, (2) the right of appeal, (3)
the right to pay no more than the correct amount of tax,
(4) the right to certainty, (5) the right to privacy and (6)
the right to confidentiality and secrecy. These rights are
usually accompanied by obligations such as the duty to be
honest; to be co-operative; to provide accurate information
and documents on time; to keep records; and to pay taxes
on time.72
Countries have also given attention to taxpayer rights
and obligations. Examples include taxpayer charters
and/or taxpayer declarations in Australia, Canada,
Hong Kong and the United States.73 Furthermore, the
Confédération Fiscale Européenne74 recently published a
Model Taxpayer Charter in cooperation with the
Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (STEP) and
the Asia-Oceania Tax Consultants’ Association
(AOTCA).75 However, in our view, one of the draw-
backs of the OECD instruments and the charters of the
various countries is that these instruments are not man-
datory nor binding, and therefore it is up to the coun-
tries to apply them – or not. In some cases, these
instruments merely serve as ‘guidance’ for tax
authorities.
2.1.3.3.2 Privacy and Data Protection Instruments
The right to privacy is protected in International
Conventions dealing with civil and political rights.
For instance, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights addresses the right to privacy in Article
17(1).76 In addition, a non-binding instrument contain-
ing the right to privacy is the 1948 United Nations
(UN) Declaration of Human Rights (Article 12). Some
binding instruments at regional level that address the
right to privacy are for instance the European
Convention on Human Rights (Article 8), as ratified
Notes
67 African initiative: Engaging with African countries on tax transparency and EOI. https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/gf-african-initiative.pdf (accessed March 2017).
68 The pilot projects and partners are Albania-Italy; Colombia-Spain; Ghana-the United Kingdom; Morocco -France; Philippines -Australia; Pakistan- the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, as stated in the 2017 Annual Report Global Forum on Transparency, three AEOI Implementation projects are underway with Saint Kitts and Nevis and
Seychelles and a new project has been launched with Uruguay partnering with Mexico. 2016 Annual Report Global Forum on Transparency at 26.
69 OECD, Taxpayers Rights and Obligations (Paris: Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD 2003).
70 These rights have been identified by the OECD in the Report on Tax Administrations in the OECD and other Advanced and Emerging Economies. The choice of countries
for this report take into account OECD members, OECD accession countries, G20 countries that are non-OECD members and non-OECD members that are observers of the
Committee of Fiscal Affairs, or whose revenue body has worked closely with the OECD over the recent years, and some countries to increase the geographical coverage (e.g.
Morocco ad Thailand). See OECD, Tax Administration 2015: Comparative Information on OECD and Other Advanced and Emerging Economies 19 (Paris, OECD Publishing 2015).
71 Introduction to OECD, supra n. 69 and Ch. 9OECD, supra n. 70. These rights and obligations were identified by the OECD in the 1990 document entitled ‘Taxpayers’
rights and obligations – A survey of the legal situation in OECD countries. Document published by the OECD Committee of Fiscal Affairs Working Party Number 8.
72 OECD, supra n. 70, at 282–288. These rights have been also addressed in the OECD, Tax Administration 2013: Comparative Information on OECD and Other Advanced and
Emerging Economics 276 (OECD Publishing 2013).
73 Pistone & Baker, supra n. 1.
74 The Confédération Fiscale Européenne is an umbrella organization that includes 26 national organizations from 21 European countries, representing more than 100,000 tax
advisers.
75 The charter is available at http://www.cfe-eutax.org/node/3 (accessed March 2017).
76 Art. 17 (1) ‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation’.
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by European countries; and the Inter-American
Convention on Human Rights (Article 11).77
However, if the country, which is a signatory to such
a convention, hypothetically does not have domestic law
to deal with the right to privacy or has not endorsed
the international agreement, then, it could be reason-
able argued that the individual will be left without
protection.78
Even if there are provisions applicable to the individual,
these provisions often have a limited scope of application
i.e. ‘individuals’ and ‘protection of personal data’. The
question will be what protection will be available if the
affected taxpayer is a legal entity? Is the taxpayer also
protected in case that the individual is acting as share-
holder of a company?
Some countries actually do have domestic law dealing
with privacy such as Privacy Acts (e.g. the United States,
Canada) or Laws to regulate the protection of personal data
(EU countries and some non-EU countries). However, one of
the drawbacks is that these domestic provisions usually do
not specifically address data protection in EOI for tax
purposes.79 Examples of personal information that will
need to be protected are for instance, the taxpayer’s address,
the identity number, civil status, and biometric information.
Within the European Union, the most important
instrument until recently was the old Data Protection
Directive (1995),80 which is also in principle applicable
to cross-border EOI.81 The 1995 Directive was repealed
and replaced by a recently adopted82 new Data Protection
Directive83 and the General Data Protection Regulation.84
Most of the cases until now (see below) deal with the old
Directive. On the basis of the Directive, Member States
must inform the data subject (i.e. the taxpayer) if they
disclose information which has not been obtained from
the data subject himself.85 In principle, it should be possi-
ble for a taxpayer to deduce a right to be informed on the
basis of this Directive. However, there are several excep-
tions to the obligations imposed by the Directive. First,
Member States are not obliged to inform the data subject if
he already is aware of the disclosure.86 Member States may
also adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the
rights contained in the Directive, if this restriction is
deemed to be necessary to safeguard an important economic
or financial interest of a Member State or of the European
Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation
matters.87 The loss of tax revenue could thus constitute a
reason for a Member State to restrict the rights contained
within the Directive (see also above).88
Another problem arises in the case that non-EU
countries have chosen to base their Laws on Data
Protection on the principles of the 1995 EU Data
Protection Directive.89 Due to the repeal of the 1995
EU Data Protection Directive, the question would be
whether the Laws of non-EU countries will change to
include the recently EU adopted changes. For instance,
in respect of the new EU Data Protection Directive
one may recommend to these non-EU countries to
adopt from the new Directive the specific definitions
of personal data, genetic data and biometric data
(Article 3)90 and the protection of the processing of
Notes
77 The text of the Inter-American Convention including Art. 11 is available at: http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic3.American Convention.htm (accessed March 2017).
78 Or it would take the victim of the breach an unreasonable amount of time to receive protection. e.g. the ECtHR will only rule on breaches of the ECHR after the prior
exhaustion of domestic remedies.
79 Some even provide a carve-out for taxation, see infra.
80 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (‘Data Protection Directive’).
81 ECJ, 16 Dec. 2008, C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, §37; T. Schenk-Geers, International Exchange of Information and the
Protection of Taxpayers 252–253 (Kluwer Law International 2009); A. Brodzka, The Road to FATCA in the European Union, ET No. 10, 517–518 (2013).
82 On 8 Apr. 2016 the Council adopted the Regulation and the Directive. And on 14 Apr. 2016 the Regulation and the Directive were adopted by the European
Parliament. On 4 May 2016, the official texts of the Regulation and the Directive have been published in the EU Official Journal in all the official languages. While
the Regulation will enter into force on 24 May 2016, it shall apply from 25 May 2018. The Directive enters into force on 5 May 2016 and EU Member States have
to transpose it into their national law by 6 May 2018.
83 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 Apr. 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free
movement of such data.
84 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 Apr. 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
85 Art. 11 Data Protection Directive.
86 Art. 11(1) Data Protection Directive.
87 Art. 13(1) e) Data Protection Directive.
88 See also, A. Rust, Data Protection as a Fundamental Right, in Exchange of Information and Bank Secrecy 191 (A. Rust & E. Fort eds, Kluwer Law International 2012).
89 A comparative analysis of the Laws or (Draft Bills) on Data protection to regulate the protection of personal data of Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and Uruguay
demonstrated that these Laws or Draft Bill (Brazil) are to a large extent based on the 1995 Data Protection Directive. For instance, in respect of the conditions for
lawful processing of data and the transfer of personal data to third countries. An analysis of the domestic provisions of these countries dealing with the right
to privacy and the right to confidentiality has been presented at the June 2016 Conference: A Sustainable Path for Tax Transparency in Developing Countries
https://www.jus.uio.no/ior/english/research/projects/global-tax-tranparency/events/conferences/a-sustainable-path-for-tax-transparency-in-develop.html (accessed March
2017). A forthcoming article addressing the main findings of this research will be published in 2017. See Mosquera et al., supra n. 5.
90 For this purpose, the definitions used in the revisited Data Protection Directive may be used. In Art. 3 of the Directive, the following definitions are provided:
(1) personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to
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these data as special categories of personal (sensitive)
data (Article 10).
2.1.3.4 Case Law
Several (regional) courts have also read specific safe-
guards into more general norms providing the right
to privacy. also been added by the respective regional
courts. One of the first cases which came to the authors’
attention is F.S. v. Germany, a case before the European
Commission of Human Rights.91 The taxpayer in this
case claimed that the information exchange on the basis
of the old mutual assistance directive (77/799/EC) was
contrary to its right to privacy as enshrined in Article 8
ECHR (‘Right to respect for private and family life’).
The Commission dismissed this claim, by stating that
the EOI was indeed an interference with Article 8
ECHR, but this interference was justified as it was:
(1) in accordance with the law, (2) taken in the interest
of the economic well-being of the country, and also
aimed at the prevention of crime, and (3) was necessary
in a democratic society to achieve that aim. A similar
approach was followed in the recent Othyma Investments
BV v. Netherlands92 and G.S.B. v. Switzerland case
(2015).93 As Baker, in our view, rightfully submitted,
if information is obtained in accordance with Article 8
ECHR prior to the exchange thereof, it is hard to
imagine that the exchange of this information will be
in breach of that article.94 This however presupposes
that the information was actually rightfully collected.
In addition, questions can arise regarding the use and
storage of the information after it has been transferred
to another jurisdiction (see below).
Recently, at the level of the European Union, the
European Court of Justice has also pronounced itself on
several cases involving the right to data protection. For
tax in particular the following cases are of importance.
In Satamedia,95 the CJEU confirmed that the collection
and transfer of data relating to the earned and unearned
income and assets of natural persons can be regarded as
the processing of personal data of the 1995 Directive
(supra).96 Later on, the Court ruled in Digital Rights
Ireland that the need for safeguards in relation to data is
even greater where personal data are subjected to auto-
matic processing and where there is a significant risk of
unlawful access to those data.97 In the even more recent
(1 October 2015) Bara case, the Court specified that
tax data should be considered as personal data and
should thus fall within the scope of the Data
Protection Directive.98 A few days later (6 October
2015), the Court, in Schrems, again emphasized the
need for an effective protection.99 On the basis of
these cases, one can reluctantly conclude that the
CJEU is increasingly taking notice of the right to
privacy.
However, one must keep in mind that the approach of
the ECJ evidently stays casuistic and might even turn
out negative for the taxpayer. An example is the Sabou
case where the Court had to rule on taxpayer protection
in the framework of the old mutual assistance directive.
In short, the Sabou100 case concerned a tax assessment
issued by the Czech tax authorities based on information
obtained from other Member States. Sabou claimed that
the tax authorities had illegally obtained information
about him, as he was not informed of the requests for
assistance (and thus not involved in formulating the
questions); and because he was also not invited to take
Notes
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part in the examination of witnesses. According to the
Court, the involvement of the taxpayer was not required,
as these procedures merely took place in the investigation
stage (i.e. information collecting), which must be distin-
guished from the contentious stage. The outcome of this
case has been heavily criticized,101 particularly because of
the artificial division the court made between both
stages.102 This demonstrates that a casuistic approach is
not always beneficial for the taxpayer nor will it neces-
sarily result in the development of a coherent overarch-
ing framework of protection. We submit that developing
a (legislative) framework will enhance the taxpayer pro-
tection in this field in a faster, more uniform and coher-
ent manner.
2.2 Some Practical Issues
2.2.1 Disclosure of Information
Information can be requested for various reasons and be
disclosed after the exchange has taken place for several
purposes.
Article 26 (2) OECD Model states that the informa-
tion shall be disclosed ‘only to persons or authorities
(including courts and administrative bodies) concerned
with the assessment or collection of, the enforcement
or prosecution in respect of, the determination of
appeals in relation to the taxes referred to in paragraph
1, or the oversight of the above’. Furthermore, in 2012
a final paragraph to Article 26(2) made it possible for
the tax administration of the supplying state to
exchange information with the receiving State not
only for tax purposes but also for non-tax purposes
(e.g. combatting corruption, anti-money
laundering).103
In general, the EOI with supervisory and administra-
tive bodies and the use of information for non-tax pur-
poses has been widely accepted by countries in their tax
treaties or TIEAs.104 However, it is not clear from these
instruments how these supervisory and administrative
bodies should be identified. 105 Therefore, the domestic
law will be applicable to determine the nature of super-
visory or administrative body. The lack of clarification
may also have consequences in the administrative and/or
criminal sanctions that may be applicable in case of breach
of confidentiality by these bodies.
The improper disclosure may also lead to confidentiality
issues in case of stolen or illegal obtained information, or
when information is shared with other countries in the
absence of an EOI agreement or proper safeguards to protect
the confidentiality of the information. The question that
should be asked is whether the confidentiality may also
apply to the use by the tax administration of illegally
obtained (i.e. stolen) information.106 In the KB-Lux case,107
the Belgian tax administration spontaneously forwarded
information on financial accounts held in the names of
Dutch residents at Kredietbank Luxembourg (KB-Lux) to
the Dutch tax administration. This information was stolen
by five KB-Lux employees and spontaneously given to the
Belgium tax authorities. In Belgium, since this information
has been obtained illegally it was (at least at that time) not
possible to use ‘tainted’ evidence.108 In contrast, in the
Netherlands, the use of this information by the tax admin-
istration was authorized by Dutch Courts.109
Notes
101 CFE ECJ Task Force, Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 2/2014 of the CFE on the Decision of the European Court of Justice in Sabou (Case C-276/12), Concerning Taxpayer Rights in Respect of
Exchange of Information upon Request, 7 Eur. Tax’n 318–321 (2014).
102 Diepvens & Debelva, The Evolution of the Exchange of Information in Direct Tax Matters, supra n. 1, at 217–218.
103 Art. 26(2) states ‘Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the
domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of,
the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, the determination of appeals in relation to the taxes referred to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of the above. Such persons or
authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions. 'Notwithstanding the
foregoing, information received by a Contracting State may be used for other purposes when such information may be used for such other purposes under the laws of both States and the competent
authority of the supplying State authorises such use’.The last paragraph in Italics was added in the update of 17 July 2012. As stated in the OECD Commentary (para. 12.3), the
aim if this new paragraph is ‘to allow the sharing of tax information by tax authorities with other law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities on certain high priority
matters (e.g. to combat money laundering, corruption, terrorism financing).
104 For illustration purposes, the TIEA concluded by Colombia and the United States allows the exchange of information for money laundering and other criminal purposes. Art.
4(8) of the TIEA concluded by Colombia with the United States in 2001 (in force Apr. 2014) includes in addition to the text of Art. 8 the TIEA, an additional text (emphasis
added): ‘Any information received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall
be disclosed only to persons or authorities of the applicant State, including judicial and administrative bodies involved in the determination, assessment, collection, and
administration of taxes under this Agreement, the recovery of fiscal claims derived from such taxes, the enforcement of the tax laws, the prosecution of fiscal violations or the determination of
administrative appeals in relation to such taxes, and the oversight of the above. Such persons or authorities may use the information only for such purposes and may disclose it in
public court proceedings or in judicial decisions of the applicant State in relation to such matters’.
105 In this argument see also M.B.A. van Hout, Gedeeld geheim, verloren geheim, Tijdschrift Formeel Belastingrecht (2015/6). Van Hout rightly states that the confidentiality provisions
in tax law are overruled by almost uncountable legal provisions that require that tax authorities provide information of taxpayers to other mainly governmental entities.
Furthermore, taxpayers are mostly not informed if the tax authorities are required to provide information to others.
106 From a perspective of exchange of information, the use of stolen information by countries has been addressed in s. 4.4. of the IFA General Report. See Oberson, supra n. 1.
107 Other examples include the ‘Falciani-list’. See on the use of leaked and stolen information by tax authorities, M. Dirkis, The ‘Lion’s Mouth’ Postbox: A Comparative Review of the
Limitations on the Use by Revenue Authorities of Leaked and Stolen Information, a paper presented to the Sydney – Max Planck Institute Tax Research Conference, University of
Sydney, 28 Nov. 2016.
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A more recent case is for instance the use of information
obtained in the so called ‘Panama Papers’. The informa-
tion obtained by the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists was made available to the public
by means of news reports and a searchable database.110
The illegally obtained information111 has been also spon-
taneously exchanged with other tax administrations
regardless of whether there are proper safeguards for con-
fidentiality in the other country and of whether there is an
EOI agreement. It appears that the diverging national
practices regarding the use of illegally obtained informa-
tion lead to the unsatisfactory result that the protection of
the taxpayer potentially depends on the nationally devel-
oped constitutional safeguards. It is clear that adopting a
fragmented approach is detrimental, in particular for
internationally mobile taxpayers (see also infra, section 3).
2.2.2 Trade (and Business) Secrets
Most instruments also provide an exception to the obliga-
tion to provide information in case the requested informa-
tion might qualify as a ‘trade secret’.
Both the OECD Model and the OECD Commentary do
not provide a definition of these terms. In the absence of a
precise definition, these terms have to be construed in accor-
dance with the domestic law of the treaty partners, by
relying on Article 3(2) OECD Model. The OECD
Commentary however warns for a too broad interpretation
of the term ‘secret’, as this might render the EOI ineffective.-
112 The protection should strike a balance between the
efficiency of the EOI procedure and the rights of the tax-
payer. In doing so, the requested state should keep in mind
that the information which is provided is also covered by the
confidentiality requirements of Article 26(2).113
This ground for refusal applies to secrets of a certain
commercial importance.114 In assessing this, three criteria
were suggested by Vogel: (1) it concerns knowledge to
which no more than a limited group of people have access,
(2) the information is capable of being exploited econom-
ically, and (3) the disclosure of the information might
place third parties at an advantage over those persons
whose interests are protected by the secret.115 A similar
description can be found in the OECD Commentary:
‘facts and circumstances that are of considerable
economic importance and that can be exploited practically
and the unauthorised use of which may lead to serious
damage (e.g. may lead to severe financial hardship)’.116
Therefore, as rightly stated by Ring when analysing the
interpretation of the wording of the OECD Commentary
to Article 26(3):
a state should not decline to disclose information simply
because such disclosure might be embarrassing, produce bad
publicity or increase taxes. Moreover, financial information
cannot generally be considered a trade secret. Just as with the
exception for privileged communications (and other similar
information protected under domestic law), this exception
permits a state to decline to provide information but does not
require it to do so. Thus, a state may disclose ‘secret’ informa-
tion if the requested state determines that subsequent disclosure
(leaking) to the public or to competitors is unlikely, given the
confidentiality provisions of the tax treaty.117
This means that the interpretation of trade secret and
business secrets is very narrow but in some cases it is up
to the Requested state to decide whether or not the
information can be disclosed.
In general, financial information, including books and
information, do not by its nature constitute such trade
secrets, but in certain limited cases, the disclosure of
such information might nevertheless reveal a trade, busi-
ness or other secret.118 In the BJY case before the
Singapore High Court, it was decided that banking
documents did not fall within the narrow scope of the
term ‘business secrets’.119 The court rejected the argu-
ment of the taxpayer that the documents which were
requested were similar to customer and supplier lists
and therefore qualified as trade secrets.
Despite the fact that the Commentary warns for a too
broad interpretation, a Dutch court has decided (in a
similar case) that even a list of business contacts might
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constitute a trade secret.120 The case concerned a request
for information from the UK to the Dutch tax authorities
regarding the shipment of Malibu-rum to a Dutch tax-
payer. The taxpayer himself provided information to the
Dutch tax authorities relating to the quantities of bottles
he sold, including the identity of its clients. The taxpayer
opposed the information exchange to the UK tax autho-
rities on the ground that his activities consisted of the sale
and resale of goods. If the producer of the goods would
become aware of the taxpayer’s clients, the produced
would be able to contract directly with those clients,
resulting in economic damage. The Court followed that
reasoning and qualified the list of business contacts as a
commercial secret. The different outcome in this case can
in our view be explained by the fact that maintaining
business contacts formed the core of the taxpayer’s activ-
ities, the reluctance of the court to exchange this informa-
tion was thus understandable.121
In assessing whether the requested state should refuse
to provide the information, it should be considered
whether the damage which is caused by exchanging the
information can at a later stage still be mitigated or
avoided.122 This clearly illustrates the importance of
involving the taxpayer in this decision, as it are his or
her economic interests which are at stake. Usually, it is
also the taxpayer himself or herself who is in the best
position to evaluate the nature of the information. In our
view, it is advisable that (1) the requested state prior to
refusing to exchange the information asks the requesting
state how the information will be used and which proce-
dures are in place to ensure the information will be treated
confidentially, and (2) that the requested state indicates
that the information contains secret information, as this
might require special measures on the part of the request-
ing state to ensure its confidentiality.123
2.2.3 Leak of Information to the Press and Third
Parties
In general terms, information may be exchanged if there is
no reasonable basis for assuming that a taxpayer involved
may suffer any adverse consequence due to the exchange.
However, no further explanation is made in the instru-
ments to exchange information to assess the existence of
such a ‘reasonable basis’; and therefore, the tax
administration will play an important role in determining
the consequences of the EOI for the taxpayer. The authors
argue that even if there are provisions in the international
EOI instruments to protect the right to confidentiality
and the right to privacy, not all countries have these
safeguards for instance because there is no treaty (the tax
treaty and EOI treaty network is far from complete) or
because there are no domestic rules in place.
Another issue which might arise is the fact that infor-
mation might be leaked to third parties such as the
press. The misuse of the TIE and the potential leaking
of business data to the press may result in financial
consequences for the taxpayer. This was analysed by the
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressing
Aloe Vera of America vs. the United States decided on
30th July 2009. 124 In this case, Aloe Vera claimed civil
damages due to the unauthorized disclosure in the
Japanese news of the information exchanged under the
provisions of the DTT between the United States and
Japan. Aloe Vera claimed damages based on the duty of
the tax administration in the United States to ensure
that the confidentiality of the EOI should be protected.
The US Court of Appeals, when analysing this case
stated that it was not established whether the tax admin-
istration of the United States knowingly disclosed false
information or knew that the foreign tax administration
would misuse that information. For the US Court, neg-
ligence is not enough to rule against the US
Government. One of the drawbacks of this decision is
that the US Court of Appeals, the US Tax
Administration and Aloe Vera focused on whether the
statute of limitation of two years to claim damages by
Aloe Vera had lapsed or not. Therefore, the Court only
analysed the scope of the duty of confidentiality by the
tax administration and the safeguards that the Receiving
state (i.e. Japan) should have implemented to prevent the
leak of information to the press very briefly.
Even if a compensation is awarded, it could be possible
that the damages are limited taking into account the
evaluation by the judge of the harm done by the disclo-
sure and the lack of proof by the taxpayer of the economic
damages. This was the conclusion of another later case
initiated by Aloe Vera in the US District Court of Arizona
and decided on 10th February 2015. 125 Aloe Vera
claimed civil damages due to the knowing disclosure of
two cases of false information by the US Tax
Notes
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Administration to the Japanese Tax Administration. The
Court estimated that in one of the cases, i.e. the unre-
ported income statement, the United States knew this
information to be false at the time of its disclosure. In
the other complaint of disclosure, the proof provided by
the taxpayer was not sufficient. In respect of the disclosure
of the unreported income statement the Court decided
that the tax administration acted negligent and that the
disclosure of false return information was unauthorized by
the tax treaty with Japan. Therefore, the Court awarded
the plaintiffs USD 1,000 each in statutory damages.
However, the claim by the plaintiffs amounted to USD
52 million.126 The judge declined to award the actual
damages requested by the plaintiffs, on the basis that it
was not demonstrated that they sustained that amount of
economic harm as a direct result of the disclosure.
From a tax policy perspective, we argue that the
taxpayers should also have access to domestic and
international legal instruments and remedies to ensure
that the confidentiality and the use of personal data are
respected.127 These remedies should not be subject to too
stringent domestic statutes of limitation. Furthermore,
economic damages should also be granted in case of
negligence of the tax administration, since the taxpayer
could also suffer damage by the inaction of the tax
administration.
2.3 Evaluation
The taxpayers’ rights have been addressed in several
instruments such as guidelines, taxpayer charters, and
declarations. One of the drawbacks of these instruments
is that they are not binding and, therefore, countries
including tax administrations may in principle decide
whether or not to apply the safeguards contained within
these instruments. In the case of guidelines and char-
ters, these instruments only serve as guidance for the
tax administrations. The only binding instrument is the
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data (1981) and its Additional Protocol of 8
November 2001 which could in principle be extended
to countries outside the Council of Europe. However,
outside the Council of Europe, this Convention has only
been ratified by a limited amount of countries.
The bilateral and multilateral instruments to exchange
information have introduced provisions addressing the
protection of the right to confidentiality and to a smaller
extent the right to privacy. The latter right has been
mainly left to International Human Rights Conventions
and to domestic legislation such as Privacy Acts and Laws.
The OECD and UN instruments also do not address
the type of personal data that can be provided. In this
context, it could safely be argued that all types of personal
data can be exchanged such as date and place of birth, tax
identification number, personal address, bank accounts,
nationality, etc. The questions will be then, what is the
legal basis to allow the exchange of personal data? What
are the remedies available for the taxpayer if the personal
data is leaked to the press or to third parties? Another
relevant issue that should be taken into account is what
happens if there is a mistaken identity and the personal
data has been already exchanged?
These questions will be more relevant in AEOI since it
will be more difficult and burdensome for the tax autho-
rities to ensure the accuracy and protection of the infor-
mation exchanged.
3 A PROPOSED SOLUTION
From the above, it is clear that the current protection of
the taxpayer’s rights is insufficient in this area. In this
section, the authors will explore the possible adoption
of a multilateral (binding) instrument for filling the
lacunae in the existing legal framework.128 The need
for such an instrument is currently greater than ever
before, due to the adoption of AEOI as the global
standard in the OECD, EU and US instruments
described in section 2.1.2.
The reasons for the multilateral instrument are
explained in section 3.1, the legitimacy in terms of parti-
cipation and representation of countries and taxpayers in
section 3.2 and the content of the BEPS multilateral
instrument in section 3.3.
3.1 Benefits of a Multilateral Instrument
The instrument itself should be in a form of a binding
Convention. The main benefits of a multilateral
Notes
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instrument would be first that no bilateral instruments
would need to be renegotiated, which would not only take
a long while, but would lead to possible divergences
between tax treaties that would be (re-)concluded. One
would also not need to wait for changes to the OECD
Model to trickle through to other Model Conventions
such as the UN and TIEA Model Conventions.
Second, the multilateral instrument would also elimi-
nate differences resulting from the application of regional
standards (e.g. the guarantees provided by European
Union Directives which are only applicable to EU
Member States).
Third, the right to privacy and the right to confidenti-
ality are guaranteed in several autonomous (human rights)
instruments. By elaborating on the protection to be pro-
vided in the specific area of EOI, taxpayers would not
need to wait several years for the protection to develop in
the regional court’s case-law, which would in turn
enhance the legal certainty and legitimate expectations
of the taxpayer.129
Fourth, the adoption of a multilateral treaty with a
binding force does not render existing soft law instru-
ments become obsolete, as in first instance they will serve
as an inspiration for the rights to be included in the
multilateral treaty, and, afterwards, they will be seen as
complementing the multilateral treaty. However, the end
result will be that the overall minimum level of protection
will have increased.
Fifth, we acknowledge that other aspects of taxpayer
protection are missing from the current EOI procedures
(in particular, there is a lack of compliance with fair trial
requirements), but we believe that the conclusion of a
multilateral instrument solely for privacy and confidenti-
ality would be easier for states than agreeing on a com-
plete framework of protection in the short term. As
mentioned in section 2.1, these two rights are definitely
relevant, are currently underexposed and are interlinked.
Lastly, the adoption of uniform standards for privacy
and confidentiality in an area where further protection is
required could also incentivize the evolution and inter-
pretation of such rights outside the area of EOI. This
could result in the long run in the development of a
true ‘global standard’.
The major downside of adopting a multilateral
instrument is that political consensus will need to be
reached. This might be even harder when taxpayer
rights are at stake in various jurisdictions. In the
past, differences in legal systems have proven difficult
to overcome when negotiating treaties, especially if
this meant that states would have to provide safe-
guards where there were previously none. For example,
the lack of agreement between states, mostly on the
part of developing states, have halted the adoption of a
widespread multilateral investment treaty.130 It cannot
be excluded that similar issues would arise here.
However, the authors remain slightly hopeful in the
light of the recent progress which was made in
the light of the Multilateral Convention (see also
below). 131
3.2 Legitimacy: Participation of Developed
Countries, Developing Countries
and Taxpayers in the Multilateral
Instrument
In order to enhance the legitimacy of the multilateral
instrument, it has been argued by one of the authors
elsewhere that multilateral instruments addressing EOI
should take into account developing, developed coun-
tries and also involve the taxpayers.132 The definition of
legitimacy has been addressed in respect of the OECD
multilateral instruments to exchange information stat-
ing that ‘input legitimacy will take into account the parti-
cipation of all countries in the decision-making process and in
the search of solutions on which the views of the OECD and
non-OECD countries including developing countries are repre-
sented. Output legitimacy will take into account the problems
of countries and citizens and the search for collective solutions
to these problems’.133
In general, the argument of input legitimacy is based
on the analysis of the instruments to exchange informa-
tion which have been developed by the OECD follow-
ing the G20 political mandate. Since developing
countries are neither members of the OECD nor the
G20, these instruments lack input legitimacy vis-à-vis
developing countries. The reason for this is that
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developing countries have ratified the OECD multilat-
eral instruments for EOI, but they have not participated
nor have they been represented in the setting of the
agenda and the drafting of the content of these
instruments.134
Furthermore, these instruments also demonstrate a lack
of output legitimacy. The main argument is that:
even though OECD and non-OECD (developing) countries
have the same goals; the mechanisms to achieve these goals
differ taking into account the differences in resources between
developed and developing countries. It is this author’s opinion
that OECD countries may have a greater benefit from the
instruments to exchange information. The main reason is
that exchange of information may result in more
revenue for countries that have the technological and
administrative resources to deal with the information
exchanged.135
In respect of the taxpayer, the multilateral instruments
to exchange information also lack input and output
legitimacy vis-à-vis the taxpayer. The lack of input
legitimacy is argued taking into account the lack of
participation of the taxpayer in the decision making
process of these instruments. Furthermore, the argu-
ment for the lack of output legitimacy is that the
multilateral instruments to exchange information do
not provide solutions to taxpayer’s problems nor do
the instruments protect taxpayers’ rights.136
The Global Transparency Forum has resulted in the rights
of taxpayer being repealed or reduced in order to comply
with the recommendations of the peer review. The aim of the
Forum is to exchange information swiftly (without delay)
and effective. For illustration purposes, the IFA 2015 general
report referred to the branch reports for Austria,
Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and
Uruguay which stated that the procedure to notify the
taxpayer including the possibility to challenge the EOI
‘have been removed entirely or cut down’. In all cases, the
removal of the right to notiﬁcation and to challenge came
about as a result of pressure from the OECD Forum on
Transparency and EOI, and as a result of a threat to give a
lower peer review rating to the countries concerned.137
Therefore, for this new multilateral instrument, the
participation and representation of taxpayers, tax
advisors and business representatives is deemed necessary.
Taxpayers and tax advisors may also participate for
instance by involving the World Taxpayers Association,
the Confédération Fiscale Européenne, the International Fiscal
Association consisting of tax advisors and academics
among others. In addition, the participation of business
representatives such as the International Chamber of
Commerce and the Business and Industry Advisory
Committee among others is also recommended.138 The
following paragraph will deal with the safeguards of EOI
to be included in the multilateral instrument.
3.3 Content of the Multilateral Instrument
3.3.1 Safeguards in Exchange of Information
In the past, Cockfield has rightly argued the risks for
taxpayers’ right to privacy due to the enhanced tech-
nology changes in TIE. This author rightly stated
that:
to the extent that the technology change promotes heightened
and ongoing sharing of taxpayer information, however, it also
amplifies the risk that taxpayer rights such as privacy may be
harmed. For this reason, governments need to ensure that
reforms promoting effective TIE include efforts to encourage
both efficient exchanges (i.e. exchanges that encourage low
compliance costs for taxpayers and low administration and
enforcement costs for tax authorities) and fair exchanges (i.e.
exchanges that respect taxpayer rights such as privacy).
Efficient and fair exchanges are discrete but related topics in
the sense that both are necessary elements to accomplish effective
TIE. If governments are not confident that their taxpayer
information will be shared in a fair manner with foreign
governments then they may be reluctant to exchange this
information, harming efficient sharing.139
However, in the present authors’ opinion it is the
responsibility of the tax administrations to ensure that
the EOI has sufficient safeguards to protect the confi-
dentiality and privacy of the information exchanged. As
rightly argued by Stewart ‘national tax agencies make
significant claims of expertise in administration and collection
of data. They must be able to manage high level computing
systems, and data storage and transmission systems, as well as
legal and financial expertise to identify and utilize relevant
data’.140
Nowadays, the technology is playing a more impor-
tant role due to the introduction of AEOI as the
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global standard. Therefore, the authors recommend the
application of the principles of reciprocity, security
safeguards, purpose specification, proportionality and
accuracy in EOI including AEOI. These safeguards are
necessary taking into account that the infrastructure to
receive the information, to process the
information, and to guarantee the confidentiality of
tax information and personal data differ among
countries.
The following safeguards were based upon interna-
tional best practices and have been found in country’s
practices as well as in the 1980 (updated in 2013)
OECD Guidelines on the protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data and the 2013
OECD report on the protection of confidentiality of
information exchanged for tax purposes.141 Similar
safeguards have also been mentioned in the guidelines
on data protection which have been published by the
Article 29 Working Party.142 In applying these prin-
ciples, the EOI will result in sending of data by the
supplying State if the following cumulative conditions
are being met:
(1) similar data can be received from the receiving State
(reciprocity)143;
(2) the receiving State ensures adequate protection of
confidentiality and data privacy that is guaranteed
by a follow up by the supplying State to guarantee
the respect of such confidentiality in the receiving
State (security safeguards) 144;
(3) the exchange is adequate and relevant145 in relation
to the purpose or purposes for which they are pro-
cessed (purpose specification)146;
(4) the sending of data does not constitute an excessive
burden for the tax administration that lacks the
administrative capacity or technical knowledge to
develop a secure electronic system to exchange data
(proportionality). This has been one of the concerns
of the OECD projects to introduce AEOI when
stating the need for developing countries to ensure
that tax administrations have the ability and the
tools needed to request, process and use
information.147
(5) the AEOI calls for the application of the principle of
accuracy available in the UN 1990 Guidelines on
Privacy and Data Protection (accuracy).148 By means
of this principle the data controller has the duty to
carry out regular checks of the quality of personal
data. This principle is important in particular when
dealing with bulks of information.
It is submitted that the conditions under which a country
may suspend the EOI should be revised in order to ensure
that all countries have safeguards to protect these rights and
the administrative capacity and infrastructure to deal with
the bulk of information that will be automatically
exchanged.149 This information will be exchanged by using
electronic systems150 that may differ between countries tak-
ing into account the administrative and technical capacity of
developing and developed countries.151
Notes
141 OECD, supra n. 4.
142 Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines for Member States on the criteria to ensure compliance with data protection requirement in the context of the automatic
exchange of personal data for tax purposes, WP 234, 16 Dec. 2015.
143 The IFA National reporters for Uruguay when addressing the principle of reciprocity stated that ‘this principle implies that, upon receiving a request to exchange
information, the requested state does not need to carry out administrative measures that are not permitted under the laws or practice of the requesting state or to supply
items of information that cannot be obtained under the laws or practice of the requesting state. The rule also states that the requesting state cannot avail itself of the
requested state’s information system if it is wider than its own'. Uruguay National Report in Exchange of Information and cross-border cooperation between Tax Authorities
(IFA Cahiers 2013), supra n. 1 at 820–821.
144 The purpose specification principle has been developed in the 2013 OECD Privacy Guidelines. Accordingly, ‘the purposes for which personal data are collected should be
specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those
purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose’. At 14. In addition, the IFA General Reporters in 2015 identified the following as a best practice: ‘[a]
requesting state should provide confirmation of confidentiality to the requested state’. See: Pistone & Baker, supra n. 1, at 80.
145 See on the interpretation of the necessity requirement in the context of interferences with the right to private life an data protection: European Data Protection Supervisor,
Developing a ‘toolkit’ for assessing the necessity of measures that interfere with fundamental rights, 16 June 2016.
146 For instance, the IFA National Reporter Colombia addressed the principle of purpose limitation as provided by the Constitutional Court stating that ‘a law enacted by the
Congress which granted general, unrestricted powers to the tax authorities to request any type of information from the taxpayers was in violation of the Constitution. The
Constitutional Court held that the tax information requested and disclosed must comply with the principle of purpose limitation (1) strictly necessary to fulfil the purposes
of the tax administration in that particular case, and (2) used only for the purposes authorized by law. Constitutional Court Judgment C-1147 of 2001. Colombia, National
Report in Exchange of Information and cross-border cooperation between Tax Authorities (IFA Cahiers 2013), supra n. 1, at 218–219.
147 See African initiative and pilot projects s. 2.1.3.2. above.
148 Guidelines concerning Computerized Personal Data Files. Resolution 45/95 of 14 Dec. 1990. See s. 2.1.3.1. above.
149 For instance the Commentary to s. 5 of the CAA refers to the OECD Confidentiality Guide and states that ‘the ability to protect the confidentiality of tax information is also
the result of a “culture of care” within a tax administration which includes the entire spectrum of systems, procedures and processes to ensure that the legal framework is
respected in practice and information security and integrity is also maintained in the handling of information. As the sophistication of a tax administration increases, the
confidentiality processes and practices must keep pace to ensure that information exchanged remains confidential’. CRS Full Version containing the Commentary to s. 5 of
the CAA para. 1 at 79.
150 Examples of these electronic systems are for instance the Common Communication Network, TLW Mail Systems, Electronic Forms, Encrypted CD’s and Track and Trace
Emails. See Oberson, supra n. 1, at 37–38.
151 The differences in countries technical and administrative capacity including the use of secure electronic systems to exchange information has been addressed in the OECD
Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters. Adopted on 6 May 2014 at 3.
Intertax
380
Countries that participate in the AEOI include both
developed and developing countries. Therefore, the
adoption of instruments by these countries may bring
problems regarding the implementation of AEOI and
the safeguards to protect such information. Developing
countries do not have the financial resources, admin-
istrative capacity and technological equipment to pro-
cess the information and to guarantee that the
information will be secured and protected. Therefore,
the Supplying state and the taxpayer should have the
right to intervene and to object in case that the
Receiving state does not have the resources to guaran-
tee the confidentiality of the taxpayer’s information.
The OECD Multilateral instruments, for example,
make the suspension possible of the EOI by one of
the countries in cases of non-compliance with confi-
dentiality and data safeguard provisions as stated in
the OECD Model and in the Competent Authority
Agreement implementing the CRS. Even if the
Supplying country has safeguards to protect the con-
fidentiality of the EOI it is very difficult to ensure
that the other country (Receiving country) will have
the same level of protection. The shortcomings of
developing countries have been partially addressed by
the OECD by introducing the African initiative and
the pilot projects between developed and developing
countries (section 2.1.3.2. above).
However, as we have addressed in sections 2.1. and 2.2.
above, in our view there are still many shortcomings in
the protection of privacy and confidentiality in EOI.
Therefore, as rightly stated by Bentley in respect of the
rise of soft law but also applicable to the developments in
the rules to exchange information ‘revenue administrators
have been placed in a position where they have to engage with
and understand taxpayers as much as they can. To do this
effectively they have to protect taxpayers and set up the frame-
works that provide effective rule of law both under the law and
through the daily operational administration of the law’.152
This means that in respect of EOI, and as part of the
rule of law, the taxpayers need to trust that the tax
administration will protect their rights to confidentiality
and to privacy. Thus, in our view, the time is right to
develop a multilateral instrument to remedy the short-
comings in the existing safeguards to protect these rights.
4 CONCLUSION
The increasing flows of information between countries
undoubtedly provides advantages in terms of increased
compliance and increased revenue. The increased avail-
ability of information also presents some challenges with
regard to the protection of the taxpayer’s rights. The right
to privacy and confidentiality, have not yet gained suffi-
cient attention in this debate. The authors conclude that
the existing safeguards in this respect are not sufficient to
tackle the existing issues. The conclusion of a specific
multilateral instrument could remedy some shortcomings.
In this respect, the authors propose the implementation of
the following safeguards: (1) similar data can be received
from the receiving State (reciprocity), (2) the receiving
State ensures adequate protection of confidentiality and
data privacy that is guaranteed by a follow up by the
supplying State to guarantee the respect of such confiden-
tiality in the receiving State, (3) the exchange is adequate,
relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or
purposes for which they are processed, (4) the sending of
data does not constitute an excessive burden for the tax
administration that lacks of the administrative capacity or
technical knowledge to develop a secure electronic system
to exchange data, and (5) the principle of accuracy, stipu-
lating that the data controller has the duty to carry out
regular checks of the quality of personal data.
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